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Abstract: The response to pain involves a non-conscious, reflexive action and a conscious
perception. According to Key (2016), consciousness — and thus pain perception — depends
on a neuronal correlate that has a “unique neural architecture” as realized in the human
cortex. On the basis of the “bioengineering principle that structure determines function,” Key
(2016) concludes that animal species such as fish, which lack the requisite cortex-like
neuroanatomical structure, are unable to feel pain. This commentary argues that the
relationship between brain structure and brain function is less straightforward than
suggested in Key’s target article.
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The central role of the cortex in pain perception is undisputed. However, is it indeed justified
to interpret pain perception as an exclusive function of the cortex, or could other brain areas
be involved? Key (2016) argues that phylogenetically old brain regions such as thalamus and
brain stem (which, by the way, are present in fish) function only in “noxious processing” and
do not contribute to the feeling of pain. A number of authors contradict this interpretation,
however, and consider those older brain regions to be a constitutive part of a neuronal
network mediating pain perception (e.g., Pessoa and Adolphs, 2011; Damasio and Carvalho,
2013; Garcia-Larrea and Peyron, 2013). If the feeling of pain does indeed depend on a “pain
matrix” integrating multiple brain areas rather than a single brain structure, couldn’t a
certain form of pain perception already be possible in the absence of the cortex?
In this context it is interesting to recall that earlier in the 20th century it had been the
thalamus, not the cortex, that was considered the central site of pain perception in man. This
was based on sound experimental observations on the relationship between pain perception
and experimental manipulation of the cortex (Perl 2007). As stated by Edelman and Tononi
(2000), “[M]any neuroscientists have emphasized particular neural structures whose activity
correlates with conscious experiences. It is not surprising that different neuroscientists end
up favouring different structures. As we shall see in a number of cases, it is likely that the
workings of each structure may contribute to consciousness, but it is a mistake to expect
that pinpointing particular locations in the brain … will explain why their activity does or
does not contribute to conscious experience.”
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Another question concerning Key’s hypothesis is whether pain perception is indeed only
possible with the “unique neural architecture” of the human cortex. From an evolutionary
(rather than a bioengineering) perspective, it is more likely that structures and functions
evolved gradually rather than suddenly popping out of the blue. What about mammalian
species with a less unique cortical structure than humans: are they able to feel pain? And if
so, where to draw the line? When does cortical structure get too simple to support pain
perception?
Nor should the possibility of convergent evolution (different structures performing the same
or similar functions) be overlooked. How are we to understand, for instance, the capability of
certain bird species to display complex behaviours such as mirror self-recognition (Prior et
al., 2008), which have been interpreted as suggestive of some level of consciousness. Yet
the higher brain functions of such bird species depend on a neuroanatomical structure — the
“wulst” (Butler et al., 2005) — which has an organization that is clearly different from that of
the cortex. In particular, the wulst lacks the “laminar and columnar organization” that is one
of the essential features for conscious neuronal processing according to Key.
How difficult the interpretation of structure-function relationships can be, and how
problematic it is to interpret the cortex as a kind of an evolutionary on-off-switch for pain
perception can be illustrated by the debate on the ability of pre-term and term infants to
feel pain. This question has long been the subject of controversy and debates.
Methodologically, the brain imaging techniques used to study pain perception in adults are
not applicable to babies, and hence the discussion of pain perception in babies relies largely
on structure-function arguments (a situation comparable to the discussion of the existence
of fish pain). In particular, the immature status of the central nervous system of infants and
the lack of myelination of its nerve fibres had been interpreted as evidence that neonates
were unable to feel pain. More recent research, however, using novel methodological
approaches, has come to the conclusion that babies, at least from week 35-37 onward, are
able to perceive pain after all (e.g., Fabrizzi et al., 2011).
When it comes to the question of pain perception in fish, we should be careful not to
recapitulate history by over-interpretation of structural observations.
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